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Barrett: Citizen Participation in the Regulation of Surface Mining

STUDENT NOTES
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE
REGULATION OF SURFACE MINING
Public participation in the regulatory process has become increasingly common in recent years, especially in environmental
matters.' The West Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Act 2
contains a number of devices by which citizens can present their
views concerning proposed strip mines and can compel enforcement of the Act's provisions.3 The federal Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977,1 by allowing citizen access to almost
every phase of the regulatory process, opens even more avenues for
participation than are currently available in West Virginia and
other states.5
I See generally Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings,
81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972). Also see, e.g., Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
7401-7642 (Pamph. 3 Nov. 1977); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended,
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1231-1376 (1978); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§
2601-2629 (West Supp. 1979).
2 W. VA. CODE §§ 20-6-1 to -32 (1978 Replacement Vol.). See also Cardi, Strip
Mining and the 1971 West Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, 75 W.
VA. L. REV. 319 (1973); McGinley, Prohibitionof Surface Mining in West Virginia,
78 W. VA. L. REV. 445 (1976).
W. VA. CODE 88 20-6-8, -11, -28, -29 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West Supp. 1978). The Act, which is administered
by the Secretary of the Interior, requires that surface mining in all states comply
with certain minimal standards, either under a state regulatory program approved
by the Secretary of the Interior, or under a federal program. The Act requires states
which wish to assume exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface mining
and reclamation to submit a state program to the Secretary within 18 months from
the date of passage. Failure to submit a state program acceptable to the Secretary,
or failure to implement, enforce or maintain an approved program will result in
enforcement of the Act under a federal program for the state. 30 U.S.C.A. §§
1253(a), 1254(a) (West Supp. 1978). Prior to the implementation of a state or
federal program, interim regulatory procedures provide certain minimal standards
for mining and reclamation. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251, 1252 (West Supp. 1978). These
interim provisions are not within the scope of this Note.
It must be noted that all of the procedures described in this Note are considered
to be minimum requirements. See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West Supp. 1978).
1 For an excellent survey of pre-Act surface mining laws in the various states
see J. DOYLE, STATE STRIP MINING LAWS, AN INVENTORY OF KEY STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN 28 COAL PRODUCING STATES, (Environmental Policy Institute 1977)
reprinted in Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings on
H.R. 2 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm.
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An invitation to citizens to take part in these regulatory and
enforcement activities represents a recognition on the part of state
and federal legislators that interested citizens can make a significant contribution to the public regulatory and enforcement process. But the zealous advocacy that typifies the citizen contribution to these processes often results from citizens' efforts to protect
their private interests. In some instances, these interests are not
synonymous with the "public interest."6 For example, the homeowner whose property abuts a proposed strip mine site may well
be concerned about the environment, the ecological balance, the
scenic beauty of his state, and the purity of his favorite fishing or
swimming location. But he is also particularly concerned that his
well might dry up, his basement walls crack, or his yard become a
resting place for debris.
The question may then be raised: To what extent are citizens
protected by the statutory procedures available to them? The
kinds of procedural stumbling blocks which face individuals who
are trying to protect their lives, homes and communities from devastation at the hands of strip mine operators are well illustrated
in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' decision in
McGrady v. Callaghan.' This Note will examine that decision, and
will further examine the newly enacted Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 to ascertain whether that legislation
might signal an end to some of the frustrations experienced under
current state law. In addition, a brief look at some of the other
public participation procedures under the new Act might provide
some guidance as to what steps interested citizens might take in
the future to protect themselves and other members of the public.
I.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE PERMIT PROCESS

Even under the much-lauded West Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Act, serious questions have been raised as to the
adequacy of the means available for participation by those who
have no ownership interest in the land being mined. These problems are illustrated by the plight of a retired coal miner, a schoolteacher, and a gas company employee whose lands lie near or adjacent to a strip mine and whose claims were recently decided by the
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. part IV, 261 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 House Hearings].
See Gellhorn, supra note 1, at 360.
244 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1978).
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West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.8 On March 9, 1976, an
application to surface mine 110 acres in Raleigh County, West
Virginia was received by the Division of Reclamation of the West
Virginia Department of Natural Resources. Notice of the proposed
operation was published as required by statute.' In response, the
petitioners and 130 other local residents initiated efforts to prevent
the issuance of the permit by sending written protests to the Division of Reclamation. At this point the interested residents encountered their first procedural hurdle in that the application did not
contain any information as to what the proposed operation would
entail." This omission was due to DNR's policy of accepting an
application upon the filing of a form which contained only such
matters as the names, addresses, and histories of the applicants,
the names of adjoining and nearby landowners, proof that the
landowners had been notified by mail, and proof of newspaper
publication. The form did not include the mining "preplans" required by law to be included in the application," yet information
as to the exact nature of the proposed mining operation was only
available in such preplans. When the preplans were submitted at
a later date, the petitioners were not notified. Indeed, they received no further word from DNR subsequent to the original notice
until they were informed that the application had been approved
and the permit granted. 2 The petitioners in McGrady v. Calaghan
thus raised for the first time issues as to the fundamental fairness
of the permit process as it affects the private citizen: the right to
adequate notice of the pending application, the right to know the
information upon which the decision is to be based, and the right
to a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the granting of the
3
permit.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals responded to
these demands in a tone that can fairly be described as hostile.
Although it did admonish the Division of Reclamation to pay
closer attention to the mandate of the statute with regard to its
KNote of Argument for Petitioner at 1, McGrady v. Callaghan, 244 S.E.2d 793
(W. Va. 1978).
W. VA. CODE § 20-6-8 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
0 244 S.E.2d at 794.
" W. VA. CODE § 20-6-8 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
£2

244 S.E.2d at 794.

Other issues of statutory interpretation were presented to the court but were
not resolved.
'
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notice requirements," the thrust of the court's opinion was its
rejection of the petitioners' claim of a constitutional right to a prior
hearing. First, the court felt that since the petitioners' properties
would not be mined, their right did not rise "to the stature of the
right of one whose property or liberty is being taken by authoritative action."'" The court reasoned that the harm that might befall
the petitioners was both indirect and potential in nature, noting
particularly that although the possibility of damage was great, the
Division of Reclamation had the duty to prevent such damage."
Finally, the court summarily concluded that the existing procedures under the statute were in fact adequate to protect the petitioners' interests, declaring that administrative havoc would result
from the additional requirement of a hearing prior to the issuance
of a permit.'7
A.

The Nature of the Property Interest

In order to challenge a statute on due process grounds, one
must establish that there is or may, be a deprivation of liberty or
property.' The apparent refusal to recognize such a deprivation in
McGrady reflects a narrow view of both the nature of property and
the impacts of surface mining."
" 244 S.E.2d at 797.

"Id. at 796.
,Id.
'7 Id. It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Caplan pointed to the availability of a "full evidentiary hearing" in explaining the adequacy of the protection
afforded by the West Virginia statute. Although W. VA. CODE § 20-6-28 (1978
Replacement Vol.) does provide for de novo review, it further provides for affirmance if the director's decision was "lawful and reasonable." See also Cardi, supra
note 2, at 355-60.
11Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
" The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in other circumstances has
taken a much broader view of property interests cognizable under the due process
clause. For example, in State ex rel. Knight v. Public Service Comm'n., 245 S.E.2d
144 (W. Va. 1978), the court held that utility ratepayers have "a common law right
to reasonable rates from any monopoly created by the State, and this right, having
existed before the adoption of our constitution, would be encompassed within the
concept of property protected by W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 10." 245 S.E.2d at 149. It
could be argued under this reasoning that the property holder's common law right
to be free from unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of property
is a cognizable property interest under the due process clause. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977). See also Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance:
TheAirport Cases in Retrospectand Prospect,71 DiCK. L. Rav. 207 (1967), in which
the author incorporates the recent trend towards recognizing nonphysical takings
into a broader theory of property.
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Rights of neighboring landowners are certainly affected by
strip mining. Legislative recognition of this reality is abundant.
For example, among the congressional findings set forth in Title
One of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
is the fact that "many surface mining operations result in disturbances of surface areas that burden and adversely affect commerce
and the public welfare by.

.

.damaging the property of citizens,

by creating hazards dangerous to life and property by degrading
the quality of life in local communities.""0 The House Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs commented that "in one state the
Veterans Administration has suspended home financing in certain
strip mining regions because poorly regulated blasting practices of
the area's mines have diminished residential property values."2 '
The West Virginia Legislature has similarly found that surface
mining "destroys or impairs the health, safety, welfare and property rights of the citizens of West Virginia, where proper reclamation is not practiced," and that in certain areas, any surface
mining would result in such injury to health and property rights.Y
In addition, numerous authors have discussed the threat posed by
strip mining to neighboring property interests.,, The extent and
nature of the damage that may result from the granting of a permit
to strip mine militates in favor of bringing those nearby within the
umbrella of due process protection.
To illustrate this point, the petitioners in McGrady drew an
analogy to the law of zoning.2 It has been held that property owners adjacent to an area which is to be rezoned to allow the intrusion
of a potentially harmful use fall within the protection of the due
process clause. In Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 the Supreme
Court of California struck down a municipal zoning change which
would permit the construction of a housing development just inside the city limits, basing its decision on the ground that nearby
30 U.S.C.A. § 1201(c) (West Supp. 1978).
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59, reprinted in [19771 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 596-97.
22 W. VA. CODE § 20-6-1 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
20
22

- Id. § 20-6-11.
21 See, e.g., Cardi, supranote 2, at 325-38; Reitze, Old King Coaland the Merry
Rapists of Appalachia, 22 CAsE WEsTEm L. REv. 650, 656 (1971). See also Sax,
Takings, Private Propertyand Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152-53 (1971).
2 Brief for Petitioner at 28-30, McGrady v. Callaghan, 244 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va.
1978).
26 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
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landowners who lived outside the city limits had not been given
notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court noted:
Zoning does not deprive an adjacent landowner of his property,
but it is clear that the individual's interest in his property is
often affected by local land use controls, and the "root requirement" of the due process clause is "that an individual be given
an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest . .

.

In an earlier case, Cugini v. Chiaradio,s the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island expressed a similar view when confronted with the
claim that neighboring landowners were denied due process when
a city allowed the construction of a government building in a residential area. Although the court ruled that the objectors (who had
in fact appeared and testified before the zoning board) had not
been denied due process, it agreed that their interests fell within
the protection of the due process clause, remarking that "a proposal to alter the zoning restrictions made applicable to particular
land may operate to depreciate the property rights of surrounding
landowners."'
It must be noted, however, that the zoning analogy is a limited
one. The issue of the rights of neighboring landowners has not often
been litigated in a constitutional framework since it is customary
for zoning statutes to require notice and a hearing before zoning
decisions are made." In addition, zoning is often said to be an
essentially legislative activity, from which the dictates of due process do not protect the individual.3 1 Finally, there is some authority
1 Id. at 549, 494 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) [emphasis added]. See also Horn v. County of Ventura, 144 Cal. Rptr. 818 (Ct. App. 1978) in which a property owner sought to enjoin
the subdivision of a neighbor's lot on the grounds that notice and hearing had not
been accorded to him. Rejecting the appellant's claim on the ground that the
determination was legislative in character, see note 31 infra, the court indicated
that had the determination been "quasi-judicial," notice and a public hearing
would have been required. 144 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
96 R.I. 120, 189 A.2d 798 (1963).
Id. at 125-26, 189 A.2d at 801.
30 See R. ANDERSON, AMEmcAN LAW OF ZONING, §§ 4.02, 4.03 (2d ed. 1976).
' See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205,
529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1975) (distinguishing Scott, supra note 26); City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668, 674 (1976); Montgomery
County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 376 A.2d 483 (1977). The
principle that the due process clause does not afford individuals an opportunity to
be heard when the governmental act complained of is legislative in nature was set
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which directly rejects the notion that the neighbors
have an inter32
est cognizable under the due process clause.
Despite these limitations, it is important to note that the zoning analogy does provide some authority for the proposition that
certain land uses may give rise to a protectable interest for those
with property rights in adjacent land. But the better justification
for protecting those landowners adjoining a proposed strip mine is
the recognition that the mine site is in reality not the only property
affected by the granting of a permit to strip mine. Professor Sax,
in the context of an article on takings, clarified this point:
Surely it is naive... to suppose that one who profits from a
piece of property necessarily uses only those resources within his
boundaries, and equally naive to think the consequences of one
property user's activities are confined to his property. Property
does not exist in isolation .

. .

. Frequently

. .

. a use of, or a

demand upon, property is at the same time effectively a use of,
or demand upon, property beyond the border of the user.?
B.

The Availability of Information

The first issue raised by the petitioner in McGrady is that of
access to information regarding the nature and extent of the proposed action. This problem was not addressed by the court apparently because in July of 1977, DNR officially changed its policy to
forth by Mr. Justice Holmes in Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441 (1915).
31See Ottinger v. Arenal Realty, 257 N.Y. 371, 178 N.E. 665 (1931); Griest v.
Hooey, 205 Misc. 396, 128 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1954); see also, Adams v. Jersey City, 107
N.J.L. 149, 151 A. 863 (1930).
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152
(1971).
The decision of a Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Kettlewell v. Hot Mix, Inc.,
556 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) provides an interesting contrast to McGrady
on somewhat similar facts. Nearby property owners had sought to enjoin the operation of a newly constructed asphalt plant on the ground that the issuance of a
construction permit without affording them notice and an opportunity for hearing
violated their due process rights. Although the court denied their claim on several
grounds, it did recognize a property interest based on the stipulated fact that "some
particulate emissions, including dust, in the plant and near plaintiffs which periodically have settled on plaintiffs' personal property and sometimes been visually
apparent in the air over plaintiffs' land" and other inconveniences had resulted
from the plant's operation. Id. at 666. It would be anomalous indeed if such interference, on stipulated facts, would constitute a "deprivation of property" under the
due process clause while the spillover effects of surface mining would not. See also
note 19, supra.
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comply with statutory language requiring applications to contain
preplans.3 ' Instead, the court simply admonished DNR that "in
the future compliance with statutory requirements should be made
and the required information should be supplied by an applicant
for a permit prior to the publication."3
Like the West Virginia law, the federal Act requires an application to contain extensive information concerning the operator
and the proposed operation. The federal Act, however, places
greater emphasis on making this information available to the public. In addition to requiring the disclosure of information concerning the operator and other persons who may be legally or financially connected with the operation," section 507 of the Act further
requires that a permit application contain other information such
as maps (topographical and cross-section);3 watershed information; ss a determination of probable hydrological consequences;39
test borings and core samplings;"0 and'in some cases climatological
factors and soil surveys." The application must also indicate the
area to be affected, the schedule of operations, the engineering
techniques to be used, the equipment to be employed, and plans
of proposed blasting."2 This permit application information is to be
made available locally, 3 either at the county courthouse or at some
other public office in the area of the mining."
I Letter from Division of Reclamation to West Virginia Legal Services Plan,
Clarksburg Office, July 25, 1977.
u 244 S.E.2d at 797.
31 30 U.S.C.A. § 1257(b)(1)-1257(b)(4) (West Supp. 1978). The history of the
operator's past violations must also be included with the application. Id, § 1260(c).
37

Id. § 1257(b)(13)-1257(b)(14).

33Id. § 1257(b)(10).

39Id. § 1257(b)(11).
10Id. § 1257(b)(17). This information is available to "any person with an interest which is or may be adversely affected," a limitation which is not imposed on
the remaining information in this section.
Id. § 1257(b)(12)-1257(b)(16).
12 Id. § 1257(e). The Act attempts to afford persons likely to be affected by
blasting an extra measure of protection. Section 515 requires notice of planned
blasting by publication and mail; public availability of blasting logs; limitations
on the type of explosives and detonating equipment and on the size, timing and
frequency of blasts; certification of blasting personnel; and availability of a preblasting survey for local residents. Id. § 515(b)(15). For a discussion of these provisions and their shortcomings see Note, Regulation of Blasting Under the Surface
Mining Control and ReclamationAct of 1977, 81 W. VA. L. Rlv. 763 (1979).
, Id. §§ 1257(b)(7)-1257(b)(9), 1257(g).
" Id. § 1257(b)(6).
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In light of all this information available at the local level
under the federal Act, it seems inconsistent that the information
required to be contained in the reclamation plan is not subject to
public inspection unless state law so requires.'" The reclamation
plan is the explanation of the methods and schedule by which the
land is to be restored after mining, and the proof that restoration
is possible. 6 In addition, the reclamation plan reflects the land use
considerations which the applicant must take into account. These
land use considerations include postmining uses of the site, possible future mining in the area, and the consistency of the operator's
plans with "local, physical, environmental, and climatological
conditions" and surface owner plans. 7 To deprive the interested
public of such information is to reveal only half the story. Indeed,
there is no justification for subjecting the reclamation plans to less
public scrutiny than the mining plans, particularly in light of the
damage that can result from improper reclamation."
C. The Adequacy of Notice
It is clear, however, that the Act does provide the interested
citizen with some opportunity to review and investigate the pro.
posed mining and its projected impacts. The House Committee
described these provisions as follows:
Each application will be available for public review at an
appropriate place. The applicant must supply proof of newspaper notice that acquaints local residents with the location of the
operation and where the application may be examined. This
requirement responds to the committee's awareness of the severe difficulty which local people frequently experience in attempting to investigate the nature of impending surface mine
operations. 9

's

Id. § 1258(b).

Id. § 1258(a) (5), 1258(a) (7). See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91,
reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 628.
1130 U.S.C.A. § 1258(a)(3), 1258(a)(4), 1258(a)(6), 1258(a)(8), 1258(a)(10)
(West Supp. 1978).
" See text accompanying notes 20-23, supra.
, H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 92, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 628. This public notice does not take place until after the
permit application is complete. 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,378 (1979) (to be codified
in 30 C.F.R. § 786.11(a)). This prevents the kind of problem experienced by the
petitioners in McGrady, where the public notification was useless because those
notified could not obtain any specific information concerning the proposed operation. See text accompanying notes 10-12, supra.
"
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But the concern which the committee expressed in recognition of
this "severe difficulty" is belied by its own statement. The flaw in
its protection of the public interest lies in the fact that newspaper
publication is the only method used to notify those who have no
legal interest in the mining operation or the minesite. It is the
newspaper, rather than personal notice, which purports to advise
the neighboring landowner of impending action. Yet "[c]hance
alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted into the back pages of a newspaper."" °
In addition, the persons most affected by the permit, the immediate neighbors, are not mentioned by name in the advertisement."
Those persons whose interests are adversely affected by such mining lose their right to participate in the administrative process
thirty days after the last of four consecutive weekly advertisements.52 It is, therefore, apparent that an individual may easily

forfeit the right to administrative access through no fault of his
own. It cannot be assumed in the absence of personal notification
that those who live adjacent to the proposed mine would have
waived such rights. West Virginia is one of the few states which
currently requires notification by mail to owners of surface area in
the immediate vicinity of the proposed site." The absence of personal notice to those most likely to be affected is a serious shortcoming of the federal Act.
There is some authority for the assertion that this notice deficiency constitutes a denial of due process. The governing principles
to be applied in determining the adequacy of such notice were set
forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.5' In
Multane, the Supreme Court of the United States overturned a
statutory provision of the New York Banking Law by which beneficiaries of a certain trust which had been pooled in a "common
trust" arrangement were notified of a judicial settlement of accounts by newspaper publication. The Court recognized the need
to achieve a balance between the state's interest in administrative
efficiency and the interests of the individual in being "informed
that the matter is pending [in order to] choose for himself

"

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1257(b)(6), 1263(a) (West Supp. 1978).

5Z Id.

§ 1263(b).

" W. VA.

CODE

§ 20-6-8 (1978 Replacement Vol.) (providing personal notice to

all surface owners within 500 feet of the proposed minesite).
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."5 Since "the
notice required does not even name those whose attention it is
supposed to attract,"" such token notice, the Court held, was inadequate to those whose interests and whereabouts were readily ascertainable."
Following Mullane, the Supreme Court has held that personal
notice must be provided when action has been taken against one's
real property. Schroeder v. City of New York 5" involved that city's
right to divert a river which flowed past the appellant's summer
home. The Water Supply Act provided that affected landowners
might participate in condemnation proceedings, provided that
they submit their claims for damages within a three-year limitation period. The appellant failed to submit her claim within the
three-year period, but the Supreme Court, relying on Mullane,
held that the newspaper advertisements and posted notices used
by the state commission did not comport with due process. The
Court asserted: "The general rule that emerges from the Mullane
case is that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a
person whose name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by
the proceedings in question."59
Even if the notice provided by the Act is not constitutionally
infirm, it represents an unwise policy. To neglect to notify those
most likely to be injured by strip mining at the risk of having them
forfeit their rights to participate in the administrative process is
to lose the benefit of the most zealous citizen input and to increase
the hostility with which surface mining so often has been met.
D.

The Opportunity to be Heard

The principal argument which the adjoining landowners presented to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in McGrady
v. Callaghanwas that due process requires that those who object
to the issuance of a surface mining permit be afforded an administrative hearing prior to the initial decision on the permit." The
question of what kind of hearing is required and when it is required
'
"

'
'

Id. at 314.
Id. at 315.

Id. at 318.
371 U.S. 208 (1962).
Id. at 212-13. See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
Brief for Petitioner, McGrady v. Callaghan, 244 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1978).
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by due process has been litigated in a variety of settings in recent
years.6 ' In 1976, the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v.
2
Eldridge"
attempted to synthesize its prior holdings and to set
forth the principles which should guide a court in making a determination on this issue. In Eldridge, a social security recipient asserted that due process required a hearing prior to the termination
of disability benefits. The Court disagreed. As an "ordinary principle," the Court stated; "something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action."63 Sound
policy dictates, to an extent, that this should be so. In certain
circumstances, even the most informal opportunity to present
one's side of the story will assure the affected party an accurate
decision and will leave that party with a sense of having been
treated fairly. 4 In addition, the sheer multitude of daily administrative decisions compels the use of informal adjudicatory proceedings wherever possible. 5 A recent survey of informal administrative adjudications shows that the vast majority involve only the
minimal requirements of notice, opportunity for comment, and
statement of reasons.6 But the establishment of this minimum
requirement provides little guidance in the multitude of differing
individual factual situations which may require more formal proceedings. To deal with the variety of situations that could exist,
the Court in Eldridge set forth a flexible test.
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the functions
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Compare Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974),
and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). See
generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
,2424 U.S. 319 (1976).

'3Id. at 343.
' For example, to demand a trial-type hearing before suspending a child from
school for ten days might justify a criticism of "overkill." See Goss v. Lopez, 419

U.S. 565 (1975).
" See, Friendly, supra note 61.
" Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CH. L. REV.
739 (1976). The model for this study was Judge Friendly's article, supra note 61.
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involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the7
additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is the only court
to have considered the issue of whether due process requires a
hearing prior to the grant or denial of a strip mining permit. Because of the court's finding that the adjacent landowners have an
insufficient property interest at stake,- the issue, though approached, was not decided on its merits. Chief Justice Caplan,
writing for a three to two majority in McGrady, considered the
prior hearing issue only in a perfunctory manner. The court treated
Eldridge with a mere synopsis of the facts and result" and made
no attempt to analyze or apply the Eldridge test which it had
adopted only a month earlier in Waite v. Civil Service
Commission." Chief Justice Caplan did, however, set forth with
approval the statutory procedures otherwise available to those who
object to the issuance of a permit, judging those procedures to be
adequate in light of his opinion that
[t]o afford any and all who desire to object to an application for surface mining a constitutional right to a full evidentiary hearing prior to the issuance of the permit could and probably would result in an administrative catastrophe. The statute
does not limit to any number or area those who may protest;
therefore, those who oppose surface mining generally, and there
are many, could demand a hearing prior to the issuance of any
permit. This would create chaos and could virtually grind surface mining to a halt.7 0
Had the supreme court of appeals thoughtfully applied the
Eldridge test to the facts in McGrady it might have arrived at a
different result. The first consideration in the Eldridge test-the
private interest that will be affected-is a substantial one in the
case of residents adjacent to a proposed strip mine. The homes, the
water supplies, and the usefulness and productivity of the lands of
neighboring residents are placed in substantial jeopardy by the
erroneous granting of a surface mine permit, especially in light of
7
the fact that some lands simply cannot be reclaimed. In addition,
67 424 U.S. at 334-35. This test was adopted by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Waite v, Civil Service Comm'n, 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977).
66

244 S.E.2d at 795-96.

241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977).
7o 244 S.E.2d at 796.
71 See

text accompanying notes 20-24, supra.
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blasting and various types of pollution may result in very real
hazards to the health of neighboring residents. To avoid these
results it is necessary for the permit applicant to be subjected to
the most exacting scrutiny.
The second part of the Eldridge test-the risk of erroneous
deprivation under existing procedures and the probable value of
additional safeguards 7 2-is somewhat more difficult to analyze
when applied to the surface mining application process. For example, the Court in Eldridge indicated that oral presentation is unnecessary when the factual basis of an agency decision is scientific
in nature, not dependent on credibility, and therefore most amenable to written communication.7 3 It might be argued that the information required to make an accurate decision concerning a strip
mine application is of this nature. However, neither the coal coinpany engineers nor the inspectors of the regulatory authority are
likely to have the kind of knowledge of the conditions in the area
which the local resident will possess. In McGrady the petitioner
argued:
The legislative criteria guiding the respondent's determination
whether or not strip mining should be allowed (and under what
limitations) relate specifically to local conditions .... Each
potential strip mine site has individual characteristics which
require careful consideration on a case by case approach and
with full development of site information. There is no substitute
for input which local residents can give concerning these diverse
conditions. Any procedure which excludes, in practice, such
7
input, invites arbitrary and capricious decision making. '
The understanding of local conditions which is so crucial to a
correct permit decision is not-a wholly scientific finding. There is
still much to be learned about the impacts that surface mining will
have on certain conditions. 5 In addition, experts may differ, and
72 424

U.S. at 343.

13 In addition, various amici had attempted to show the risk of error in terms
of the percentage of reversals. Under West Virginia strip mine law, however, decisions of the director granting permits are generally upheld by an industry-oriented
Board of Review which must affirm if the director's decision was "reasonable." W.
VA. CODE § 20-6-28 (1978 Replacement Vol.). See Cardi, supra note 2 at 355-60.
11 Brief for Petitioner at 32-33, McGrady v. Callaghan, 244 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va.
1978). See generally 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1257, 1258, 1260 (West Supp. 1978).
Is For example, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs has noted
that "as the scale of surface coal mining has expanded in Appalachia, large earthmoving technologies have raised issues of stability and planning that are not yet
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a confrontation between agency experts and those retained by private citizens should result in a better analysis of technical data."
The third element in the Eldridge due process test is the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative considerations at stake." In McGrady, Chief Justice Caplan stressed the
catastrophic effect on the administrative process of granting a
prior hearing to every objector. 8 But the Chief Justice appears to
have made an assumption that a separate hearing would be required for each individual protestor, and proceeded from this asumption to paint his bleak picture. A single hearing prior to the
decision on each permit application could give objectors an opportunity to be heard while avoiding excessive burdens on the regulatory authority. Moreover, even if the Chief Justice was suggesting
that a single hearing on every permit would be too burdensome,
this concern, though legitimate, was probably overstated.
A final consideration reinforces the view that those who chalfully resolved." H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 596.
78

See generally Sive, Securing, Examining and Cross-ExaminingExpert Wit-

nesses in Environmental Cases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1175 (1970).
424 U.S. at 347.
7'See text accompanying note 70, supra.
7'In the hearings on the federal Act, arguments similar to thqse made by the
Chief Justice were made in opposition to the proposed legislation's requirement of
a public hearing prior to any permit decision. In response to one such argument,
Committee Chairman Udall remarked:
You refer in your statement to the burdensome need for public hearings
and you say in West Virginia with 300 permit applications you would
have had to have 300 hearings last year. My own philosophy on this goes
to two things: one, that these hearings could be concurrent or consolidated .... You can have 8 or 10 hearings at the same place, same day,
and run them through.
I understand industry's point of view, but the reason so many environmentalists and citizens' groups have been angered and have sought
these delays is there is really no place for them to go and make their case.
Once you give them the machinery for the public hearing so they know
they will get some notice, or if a particular operator is not responsible
they can shout and scream in front of somebody who has the power to do
something about it. Once we pass this bill and get uniform standards and
industry gears up to comply with it, you will find that these hearings run
through very quickly, that you won't have the kind of extreme situation
you fear.
1977 House Hearings, supra note 5, part II at 183. On the other hand, the prior
hearing requirement in the federal Act was ultimately changed to an "informal
conference." See note 84, infra.
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lenge the issuance of a permit should have an opportunity to be
heard. Since the decision to allow surface mining in a certain area
can have serious social and environmental impacts it is essential
that those affected be left with a sense that their interests have
been given a fair consideration. A prior hearing can contribute
significantly to this sense of fair treatment."
E. PriorHearings Under the FederalAct
To the extent that the holding of McGrady v. Callaghan is
that one who opposes a strip mine has no right to a hearing prior
to the granting or denial of a permit, its future impact is limited.
Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
those who desire to enter oral objections prior to the issuance of a
permit will have an opportunity to do so once the Act is implemented in its entirety through an approved state program or federal program. Section 513 mandates that an informal conference
be held in the area of the proposed mining upon timely request by
"eany person with an interest which is or may be adversely affected" or by the officer or heads of certain governmental bodies.,
The Act is unclear as to the exact nature of this conference,
however. For example, the Act fails to mention who the parties
shall be, although it is clear that objectors can be parties. It further
fails to provide for notice of the conference other than by publication, even to those who request it." Section 510, moreover, refers
to the procedure set forth in section 513 as a "public hearing,"
although the text of section 513 does not use the term except in the
section title. 3
The informal conference does not appear to be intended to be
an adjudication.8" Rather, it has been described as a forum in
11This element of the due process analysis, although absent from the Eldridge

test, is nevertheless cited by scholars as an important consideration. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 542-43 (1978).
8130 U.S.C.A. § 1263(b) (West Supp. 1978).
R2

Id.

Id. § 12 60(a).
" This aspect of the legislative history is somewhat confused. The Senate Bill
(S.7) used the informal conference as an alternative to a "nonadjudicatory public
hearing" in section 413 (the Senate version of § 513). S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 80 (1977). The House bill, which was adopted (see H.R. REP. No. 493,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1977)), was amended to delete the "public hearing"
language, providing only for an "informal conference" prior to the issuance or
denial of the permit. Upon proposing this amendment, Congressman Murphy (Pa.)
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which citizens can air their objections in an informal setting. 5 But
it is important to note that the Act does contemplate some degree
of formality. For example, a record is required, unless waived.
Although the Committee of Conference expressed a belief that this
record need not be "as formal and complete as would be required
for records of formal hearings,"s6 the Act specifies the use of electronic or stenographic means 7 as opposed to a report by the agency
representative. Additionally, a party may be allowed access to the
proposed minesite "for the purpose of gathering information relevant to the proceeding."" The presence of counsel and indepensuggested that this change would result in conformity with Pennsylvania practice.
123 CONG. REc. H3771 (daily ed. April 28, 1977). See also 123 CONG. REc. H2595,

2604 (daily ed. April 29, 1977) (extensions of remarks of Reps. Udall and Murphy).
Pennsylvania law requires a prior hearing in some circumstances, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 52 § 1396.4b (Purdon Supp. 1978-79); other pre-permit hearings are discretionary and informal. See Surface Mining Control and ReclamationAct of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm.
on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 286-87, 293 [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Senate Hearings]. Perhaps the best description of the nature of the
informal conference appears in the "Additional Legislative History" presented to
the House of Representatives by the Conference Managers on July 21, 1977. 123
CONG. REc. H7586 (daily ed. July 21, 1977):
The informal conference procedure contemplated by the conferees is not
intended to be a private, closed-door "back room meeting", but rather a
serious public forum, similar to Congressional hearings with full notification accorded to the public, which addresses all objections and questions,
and whose proceedings are recorded and made an open public record.
This compromise takes away the expense and overkill of a public hearing
at every turn, but preserves the righis of objectors and retains a necessary
forum for public involvement.
It is interesting to note that in the proposed final regulations, the Office attempted to limit the issues to be examined in the informal conference to those
raised in the written objections, comments and requests for conferences. 43 Fed.
Reg. 41,662, 41,862 (1978) (proposed regulation 30 C.F.R. § 787.14(b)(4)). This
limitation was deleted in the final regulations.
This will allow the regulatory authorities to adopt whatever procedures
they consider necessary to control consideration of issues at the conferences. However, this is to be done subject to the policy that all information concerning the sufficiency of the application, the applicant, the area
to be affected, and whether the criteria for approval are met are relevant
and proper for consideration at these conferences.
44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 15,099 (1979).
11123 CONG. REc. H3771 (daily ed. April 28, 1977).
81H.R. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 738.

- 30 U.S.C.A. § 1263(b) (West Supp. 1978).
A Id.
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dent experts seem to be consistent with the degree of preparedness
that these provisions suggest. But the informal conference is not
the full adjudication: the information gathered at such a conference, the issues confronted therein, and any agreements which
might result comprise only a part of the decision to grant or deny
a permit.
F. Post-IssuanceProceedings
After the informal conference, the parties are to be notified of
the granting or denial of the permit, by notice containing a written
statement of the findings of the regulatory authority and "the
reasons therefor.""5 At this point "the applicant or any person with
an interest which is or may be adversely affected" may request a
formal adjudicatory hearing under section 514 on "the reasons for
the final determination.''
Because of the possibility that mining activities will cause
irreparable damage before the formal hearing can be completed,
the prior informal conference may be an inadequate substitute for
a full evidentiary hearing before a permit is granted. Congress has
addressed the problem to some extent by allowing the federal or
state hearing authority to grant temporary relief from the granting
or denial of a permit." It must be pointed out, however, that this
procedure is a limited device. Temporary relief is granted on a
wholly discretionary basis. 2 In addition, parties must be notified
and given an opportunity to be heard and "the person requesting
such relief [must show] that there is a substantial likelihood that
he will prevail on the merits of the final determination of the
proceeding." 3
The formal hearing which follows the permit decision is specifically adjudicatory in nature and subject to the requirements of
section 554 of the Administrative Procedures Act"' or its state
counterpart." But the wording of the provision raises questions
Id. § 1264(a).
Id. § 1264(c).
" 30 U.S.C.A. § 1264(d) (West Supp. 1978).
'2 "The Secretary. . . or the state hearing authority may, under such conditions as it may prescribe, grant such temporary relief as it deems appropriate
." Id. The operator may also find temporary relief under this section.
30 U.S.C.A. § 1264(d) (West Supp. 1978).
5 U.S.C.A. § 554 (1977).
'5 "Where the regulatory authority is the State, such hearing shall be of record,
adjudicatory in nature, and no person who presided at a conference under section
'o

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss4/7

18

Barrett: Citizen Participation in the Regulation of Surface Mining
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

which may have serious consequences. From the "final determination" on the permit application there has emerged a record of the
informal conference, the findings by the regulatory authority, and
a statement of reasons for the findings. The fact that the appeal is
described in the Act as a hearing on the reasons for the final
determination" indicates that this procedure is a review of that
decision. If so interpreted, there are two problems. First, the
"hearing on the reasons" might be viewed as a limitation, confinlitigated on appeal to those designated as
ing the issues
"reasons." 9 Although this limitation might make sense from the
standpoint of an aggrieved applicant who must have notice of the
asserted deficiencies in his plans in order to prepare his case,98 from
the standpoint of an aggrieved citizen-objector such an interpretation might mean that important issues are dispensed with at a
level at which the citizen is without the tools of formal adjudication. Such a limitation should not be applied: the reason for approving any application is that all of the requirements of the Act
have been satisfied." Therefore, any alleged deficiency should be
subject to 'adjudication under section 514.
The second problem raised by section 514 is whether there is
any other limitation on the scope of this review of the permit
513(b) shall either preside at the hearing or participate in this decision thereon or
in any administrative appeal therefrom." 30 U.S.C.A. § 1264(c) (West Supp. 1978).
" Id. § 1264(c).
It appears that the Office of Surface Mining may have taken this approach.
In the final regulations, the Office requires the regulatory authority to give "specific
reasons" for its decision. 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,381 (1979) (to be codified in 30
C.F.R. § 786.23). Explaining this requirement, the Office commented, "a regulatory
authority should ordinarily list the specific facts and reasons behind each decision
in order to limit the issues in any appeal." 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 15,102 (1979). See
also Romanek, Permit Issuance-Administrativeand JudicialReview-Observations and Problems, 7 NAT. REsOURCEs LAw 225, 226 (1974), describing E.P.A.
permit procedure regulations under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
supra note 1.
" It is interesting to note that section 514 as originally proposed allowed only
the applicant to request a hearing.
If the application is disapproved, specific reasons therefor must be set
forth in the notification . . . . [T]he applicant may request a hearing
on the reasons for said disapproval.
123 CONG. REC. H3763 (daily ed. April 27, 1977). In this context the term "hearing
on the reasons" makes sense.
" The regulatory authority cannot issue a permit unless it finds in writing that
all of the requirements of the Act and the regulations have been met. 30 U.S.C.A.
§ 1260(b) (West Supp. 1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,380 (1979) (to be codified in
30 C.F.R. § 786.19).
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decision. The presence of a record in the conference proceeding
suggests a limited review of the record; but it must be remembered
not only that the record may be waived, or that it may be incomplete, but also that the record of the conference is only part of the
evidence considered in making the decision to grant or deny the
permit. These factors militate in favor of de novo review but do not
completely refute the possibility of deference to earlier decisionmaking which was not subject to the rigors of the adversary process.
Such ambiguities in the procedures for the granting or denial
of a permit are most unwelcome, given the structure of the federal
Act. If there is a procedural focal point in the Act, it is the permit
procedure. It is only at this point that the operator has the full
burden of showing that the proposed mining operation will be able
to comply with all aspects of the Act.' °° Furthermore, if a permit
has been erroneously granted, it may be difficult to avert the destruction that could result. Once granted, revocation or suspension
of a surface mining permit is unlikely, for a "pattern of violations"
must first be found in order for suspension or revocation proceedings to commence. 01 The definition of "pattern of violations" is
unclear.152 In addition, the establishment of a pattern of violations
does not trigger the procedures for revocation or suspension unless
the failure to comply with the Act or the permit conditions is
"unwarranted" or "willful."'0 3 Such a requirement may preclude
an order to show cause why a permit should not be revoked in the
situation where the failure to comply resulted from error at the
planning stage rather than from any lack of diligence in the operation of the mine. Cessation orders, like the suspension and revocation procedures, are not an effective substitute for thorough analysis at the permit level since they are designed to be emergency
measures.' Finally, even though judicial review of permit deci1w30 U.S.C.A. § 510(a) (West Supp. 1978). Note that when permit renewal is

sought, the burden shifts to those opposing renewal. 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,384
(1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 788.16(b)).
202

30 U.S.C.A. § 1271(a)(4) (West Supp. 1978).

The proposed regulations for the Initial Regulatory Program attempted to
arrive at a mechanism for determining the existence of a pattern of violations. An
attempt to set up a "natural norm" as a yardstick met with considerable objection
and was deleted from the final verson. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,669, 62,702 (1977) (to be
"1

codified in 30 C.F.R. § 722.17).
"1 30 U.S.C.A. § 1271(a)(4) (West Supp. 1978).
2 Id. § 1271(a)(2). It is the emergency nature of the cessation order which
refutes the charge that the ability of an inspector to shut down an operation under
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sions is available, the scope of review is limited."'
The need for accurate evaluation of all relevant factors at the
permit stage is compelling. Yet the permit procedures set forth in
sections 513 and 514 contain a number of uncertainties. Such procedures do provide a forum in which those opposing issuance of a
strip mine permit may be heard, as well as a means by which
action may be taken to prevent severe damage to the area surrounding the proposed mine site and to the environment in general. If measured by a due process standard they may pass constitutional muster, but it might well be argued that a more adversary
procedure is necessary prior to the issuance of a permit. It is essential that these procedures be handled with a full appreciation of
the property, health, and environmental interests at stake when an
application for a surface mining permit is considered.
II.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN OTHER AREAS: THE CITIZEN AS
ENFORCER

Participation in the permit process is only one of the means
chosen by Congress to promote citizen involvement in the regulation of surface mining. The enforcement provisions of the Act similarly provide for the citizen participation that is necessary to ensure that the Act is enforced with zeal and that relevant facts are
brought to the attention of the regulatory body.
A.

Inspections

The primary responsibility for the enforcement of the Act has
been placed upon the states,'" although the federal Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement oversees, to an extent,
the state programs. A feature of this oversight is the federal inspection program, which provides for not less than one partial inspection per month and one complete inspection per calendar quarter
for every surface mining operation under state control.107 Section
this section denies the operator due process. In re Surface Mining Litigation, 456
F. Supp. 1301, 1319-21 (D.D.C. 1978). See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing, 416 U.S. 663, 676-80 (1974); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 378, 379
(1971).
'0 30 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a)(2), 1276(b) (West Supp. 1978).
oI H.R. RzP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129, reprinted in [1977J U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 661. Enforcement procedures are required to be built into
every state program developed under section 503. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1253(a)(2) (West
Supp. 1978).
07 30 U.S.C.A. § 1267(c)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
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517, which prescribes these inspections, invites citizen participation:
Any person who is or may be adversely affected by a surface
mining operation may notify the Secretary or any representative of the Secretary responsible for conducting [a federal]
inspection, in writing, of any violation of this chapter which he
has reason to believe exists at the surface mining site.'"'
Although this section does not specifically require immediate
inspection, it does require that a federal inspector investigate the
allegation. The complaining party may also require the Secretary
to investigate the adequacy of the inspection, in which case the
Secretary must furnish "a written statement of reasons for the
Secretary's determination that adequate and complete inspections
have or have not been made.""0 ' The person who has complained
of the violation also has the right to obtain an informal review of
an inspector's refusal to issue a citation and must be provided with
a written statement of the reasons for the final disposition of the
matter."'
In addition to the procedures set forth in section 517, section
521 provides a more effective means of citizen enforcement.
Whenever, on the basis of information available to him, including receipt of information from any person, the Secretary has
reason to believe that any person is in violation of any requirement of this chapter or any permit condition required by this
chapter, the Secretary shall notify the state regulatory authority . . ..
If the state fails to act within ten days on the basis of this notifica.
tion or if the person providing the information can prove that
"imminent danger of significant environmental harm exists and
the state has failed to take appropriate action," the Secretary is
required to order an immediate inspection." 2 The person who provided the information is then notified and is permitted to attend
the ordered inspection.
The use of the phrase, "whenever . . . the Secretary has reason to believe that any person is in violation ... ", might serve to
'O Id. § 1267(h)(1).
102Id. § 1267(h)(2).

I'DId. § 1267(h)(1). "This provision could be very useful in avoiding litigation."
S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1977).
M 30 U.S.C.A. § 1271(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
112Id.
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place a potentially difficult burden upon the citizen to satisfactorily show such a violation. Yet the House Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee indicates that a "reasonable belief could be
established by a snapshot of an operation in violation or other
simple and effective documentation of violation.""' Although documentation may"still prove to be a problem, it is clear that Congress intended for the Secretary to be receptive to citizen complaints.
Even though the terms of section 521 are directed to federal
enforcement, section 521(d) imposes the same substantive and
procedural requirements upon state enforcement programs.
As a condition of approval of any state program submitted pursuant to section 503 of this act, the enforcement provisions
thereof shall, at a minimum, incorporate sanctions no less stringent than those set forth in this section, and shall contain the
same or similar procedural requirements relating thereto."'
Although this section may be read to require comparable procedures for "sanctions" rather than inspections, the legislative intent
militates against such an interpretation."'
A further indication of the legislative intent to include the
private citizen in the enforcement process is that administrative
appeals from agency enforcement decisions are not limited to those
brought by mine operators and owners. Section 525 allows "any
person with an interest which is or may be adversely affected" by
a notice of violation or a cessation order, "or by any modification,
vacation or termination of such notice or order," to apply to the
Secretary for review." 6 This review includes "such investigation as
the Secretary deems appropriate," and must include, on request,
a public hearing subject to section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act. In addition, one may recover costs incurred in participating in such proceedings. " '
M3H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 661.

30 U.S.C.A. § 1271(d) (West Supp. 1978).
See 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,456-57 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §§
840.15, 842.12). In applying the federal standards for citizen participation to state
inspection and enforcement programs, the Office relied on legislative history in S.
REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., It Sess. 59, 90 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 129 reprintedin [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 661. 44 Fed.
Reg. 14,902, 15,297 (1979).
JIG
30 U.S.C.A. § 1275(a) (West Supp. 1978).
"4
"5

"I Id. § 1275(e).
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Citizen Suits

In addition to administrative enforcement methods, citizen
suits are permitted in district courts under section 520 of the Act."'
Under this section, "any person having an interest which is or may
be adversely affected may commence a civil action on his own
behalf to compel compliance with this act.""' This provision sets
forth the "broadest standing requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court."'' 0 In order-to meet these requirements one must
allege injury in fact,"' but such injury may merely be to one's
interest in "aesthetic and environmental well being.""'2 In addition, practical considerations such as the absence of jurisdictional
amount or diversity requirements, and a provision for an award of
costs encourage citizens to assume the role of "private attorneys
general," provided that such citizen suits are brought in good
faith. ' n
"I Citizen suit provisions are common in environmental legislation. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (Pamph. 3 Nov. 1977) (Clean Air Act, as amended); 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1365 (West Supp. 1977 & Pamph. 4 1978) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
as amended); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1540 (West Supp. 1976) (Energy Policy and Conservation Act).
"' 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(a) (West Supp. 1978).
,20
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 626. See also S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 87
(1977), in which the Senate Committee adopted the same interpretation of the
standing requirement despite the fact that section 420 of S.7 read "any person with
a valid legal interest."
,2,
Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) with United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687
(1973). See also Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970).
' U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973). "Neither the fact that the
appellees here claimed only a harm to their use and enjoyment of the natural
resources of the Washington area, nor the fact that all those who use those resources
suffered the same harm deprives them of standing." Id.
See also 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,314 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 700.5):
Personhaving an interest which is or may be adversely affected orperson
with a valid legal interest shall include any person(a) Who uses any resource of economic, recreational, aesthetic, or
environmental value that may be adversely affected by coal exploration
or surface coal mining and reclamation operations or any related action
of the Secretary of the State or the State regulatory authority; or
(b) Whose property is or may be adversely affected by coal exploration or surface coal mining and reclamation operations or any related
action of the Secretary or the State regulatory authority.
I' 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(a), 1270(d) (West Supp. 1978). The award of costs includes the costs of attorneys' and experts' fees. The importance of such a provision
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Several portions of section 520, however, create limitations on
the effectiveness of the citizen suit provisions. Except where the
violation constitutes an imminent threat to health or safety or
would immediately affect a legal interest, suits may not be brought
until the state, the Secretary, and the alleged violator have had
sixty days notice of the action. 12 This delay could be a costly one
to the environment. As a practical matter, it may be that Congress
never intended for most of these suits to come to fruition. This type
of notice provision has been viewed by some courts as a device
designed to give the regulatory authority time to investigate and
to take voluntary action on its own.12 Nevertheless, citizen suits
are an important means of bringing environmental issues before
the courts, especially for the purpose of compelling agency action.
Suits may be brought against the Secretary or the state regulatory authority alleging a failure to perform "any act or duty
under this act which is not discretionary with the Secretary or with
the appropriate state regulatory authority. 126 Since the court has
"jurisdictipn to decide whether a function is mandatory or discretionary,"'2 the citizen suit is a vehicle by which one can urge an
interpretation of the Act which may differ from the agency interpretation.'1 Through this device, the active participation of the
should not be underestimated. See, Cramton & Boyer, Citizen Suits in the Environmental Field: Peril orPromise?, 2 EcoLoGY L.Q. 407, 417 (1972). It is also important
to note that one may not have to win the citizen suit in order to be awarded costs.
Costs can be awarded to "any party." The ability of the court to award costs to
any party also means that costs may be awarded to the defendants in such an
action. An action merely to "harass and embarass" or an action motivated by
"malice and vindictiveness" may result in an award to the defendant. H.R. REp.
No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90, reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws

593, 627, citing United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (3rd
Cir. 1975); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976).
"A30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(b) (West Supp. 1978). That section also prohibits the
bringing of an action "if the Secretary or the State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require
compliance." The citizen may, however, intervene as a matter of right in any
federal court action. Id. § 1270(b)(1)(B).
'2 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 728 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Metropolitan Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d
809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
12, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(a)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
,,Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 411 F. Supp. 864, 866
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
" For example, in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.
1972), aff'd by an equally divided court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), the court disagreed
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courts in the interpretation of the Act may be enlisted.'29 It must
be noted, however, that in an action against an operator, unlike an
action against a governmental agency, the scope of judicial interpretive power is severely limited, for actions may be brought
only for alleged violations of "any rule, regulation, order or permit
issued under this title." By allowing actions against operators or
owners only for violations of the positive commands of the agency,
Congress has relieved persons who are acting in compliance with
agency regulations and permit conditions of the burden of having
to defend citizen suits alleging violations of the Act. I This section,
however, permits a person who has been injured as a result of
violations by an operator to recover damages for those injuries; this
right exists in addition to whatever rights the injured party might
have under common law or state statute.13' Actions against the
United States or any other governmental instrumentality may be
brought for alleged violations of the Act as well.
C. Designationof UnsuitableAreas
Of all of the devices available for enforcing the Act, the most
important and the most controversial is section 522, which provides for the designation of certain lands as unsuitable for surface
coal mining.3 2 This section prohibits surface mining on certain
national parklands and other federally protected areas, on areas
within 100 feet of a public road, within 300 feet of an occupied
dwelling, public building, public park, or within 100 feet of a cemetery.13 More importantly, section 522 allows "any person having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected" to petition the
regulatory authority for the designation of certain lands as unsuitwith the Environmental Protection Agency's apparent view that it had no duty to
impose upon the states a stringent policy of non-degradation of existing clean air.
I For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320,
328 (2d Cir. 1976), the court ruled: "[tihe structure of the Clean Air Act as
amended in 1970, its legislative history, and the judicial gloss placed upon the act
leave no room for an interpretation which makes the air quality standards for lead
under § 108 discretionary." See also Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Group, 426

U.S. 1 (1976).
130See Dunlap, An Analysis of the Legislative History of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1975, 21 ROCKY MTN.MIN. L. INST. 11, 51 (1975).
'' 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(e), 1270(f) (West Supp. 1978).
' Id. § 1272. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of this type
of provision, see McGinley, supra note 2, 463-73. See also Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962); Sax, supra note 33.
'3 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(e) (West Supp. 1978).
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able for surface mining.' Upon petition, such a designation is
requiredif the regulatory body finds that proper reclamation of the
land is not technologically and economically feasible.,,
The Act further authorizes the regulatory authority to designate other lands unsuitable for certain types of surface mining if
such mining will:
(A) be incompatible with existing state or local land use plans
or programs; or
(B) affect fragile or historic lands in which such operations
could result in significant damage to important historic, cultural, scientific, and aesthetic values and natural values and
natural systems; or
(C) affect renewable resource lands in which such operations
could result in a substantial loss or reduction of long-range
productivity of water supply or of food or fiber products, and
such lands to include aquifers and aquifer recharge areas; or
(D) affect natural hazard lands in which such operations
could substantially endanger life and property, such lands to
include areas
subject to frequent flooding and areas of unstable
38
geology.1
It is important to note, however, that the Act seems to require
that the designation process occur only upon petition. The state
regulatory authority is not specifically required to conduct an
ongoing review of state lands in the absence of a petition.,1" It is,

however, required to develop a process which includes:
(A) a state agency responsible for surface coal mining lands
review;
(B) a data base and inventory system which will permit proper evaluation of the capacity of different land areas of the
State to support and permit reclamation of surface coal mining
operations; [and]
(C) a method or methods for implementing land use planning
decisions concerning surface coal mining operations.'1
ImId. § 1272(a), 1272(c).
'
Id. § 1272(a)(2).
'
Id. § 1272(a)(3). Designations under these criteria are "discretionary." H.R.
REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 94, reprintedin [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.
NEWs 593, 630.
"I See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(2), 1272(a)(3) (West Supp. 1978); S. REP. No.
128, 95TH CONG., IST Sass. 93 (1977).
30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(a)(4)(A), 1272(a)(4)(B), 1272(a)(4)(C) (West Supp.
13K
1978).
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Although these sections suggest that there may be a duty to
review lands sua sponte,13' the Office of Surface Mining does not
appear to have taken this view.140 Therefore the burden may fall
largely upon the shoulders of private citizens to implement this
crucial section of the Act.
It is especially significant that once an area is under study for
designation as unsuitable for surface coal mining, a permit application to mine the area cannot be granted"' unless the applicant
had made "substantial legal and financial commitments" to the
operation prior to January 1, 1977.142 Active citizen participation
' The use of the term "review" suggests that the state regulatory authority
might have such a duty, especially when compared with the language in section
522(b) which provides: "The Secretary shall conduct a review of the Federal lands
to determine, pursuant to the standards set forth in paragraphs (2) and (3) of
subsection (a) of this section, whether there are areas on Federal lands which are
unsuitable for all or certain types of surface coal mining operations." Id. § 1272(b).
Under a strict reading of the statute, the state regulatory authority would not
be permitted to petition for a designation since it is not a "person" within the
definition set forth in section 701(19). 30 U.S.C.A. § 1291(19) (West Supp. 1978).
One might argue that the state need not petition since it is anticipated that the
state will be evaluating and reviewing lands on its own. The Office has taken a
different approach, however, treating the apparent inability of the state to petition
as a matter of inadvertence. State agencies are included in the definition of
"person" in the regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,314 (1979) (to be codified in 30
C.F.R. § 700.5), on the ground that "participation in the process. . . should be as
broad as possible." 43 Fed. Reg. 41,662, 61,684 (1978).
"I The Office's interpretation of section 522(b)(4) might result in some active
review by the state regulatory authority independent of petitions. In response to one
comment to the proposed final regulations, the Office stated: "The final regulation
makes clear that the regulatory authority must gather data not only in response to
petitions, but also in anticipation of petitions." 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 15,004 (1979).
See 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,346 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 764.21).
Presumably this data-gathering process might trigger petitions by the state agency,
but there appears to be no duty on the part of the state to actively review state lands
to determine if they are unsuitable.
"I The final regulations provide: "Any petitions received after the close of the
public comment period on a permit application relating to the same mine plan area
shall not prevent the regulatory authority from issuing a decision on that permit
application." 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,345 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. §
764(a)(7)).
112 30 U.S.C.A. § 1260(b)(4) (West Supp. 1978).

The phrase, 'substantial legal and financial commitments'

..

is

intended to apply to situations where, on the basis of a long-term coal
contract, investments have been made in powerplants, railroads, coal
handling and storage facilities and other capital intensive activities. The
committee does not intend that mere ownership or acquisition costs of the
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in this process can be most instrumental in preventing the commencement of unreclaimable strip mines. The petition may have
the added effect of supplementing the informal permit conference
with a public hearing on the possible designation of the area as un4 3
suitable prior to any decision on the permit.
D.

Release of Performance Bonds

Another area in which the federal Act invites participation by
citizens is the procedure for the release of performance bonds.
Section 519 of the Act requires the operator requesting the release
of all or part of a performance bond to advertise the location of the
area secured by the performance bond and to notify by mail local
government bodies, certain agencies and water authorities, and
adjacent landowners of the proposed release.' "Any person with
a valid legal interest which might be adversely affected by the
release" and certain agencies are given the right to file objections
and to request a public hearing on the bond release.'4 5 A public
hearing must then be held unless the parties are able to settle their
differences through an optional informal conference procedure.'46
A significant issue is raised by the use of the phrase "any
person with a valid legal interest which might be affected." Al-

though this term clearly contemplates citizen participation,'

7

it

may be argued that the class of citizens who have, standing to
coal itself or the right to mine it should constitute 'substantial legal and
financial commitments.'
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, 593, 631.
"I Section 522(c), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1272(c) (West Supp. 1978), requires that a
public hearing on the petition be held within ten months of its receipt. This hearing
is described in the final regulations as "legislative and fact-finding in nature, without cross-examination of witnesses." 44 Fed. Reg. 15,312, 15,346 (1979) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 764.17(a)). The Office felt that "cross-examination might be
used to intimidate witnesses whose own experience might provide valuable information for the record." 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 15,004 (1979).
"1 30 U.S.C.A. § 1269 (West Supp. 1978). The performance bond is a customary device for insuring that strip mined lands are properly reclaimed. Under the
Act partial release of such bonds may be allowed upon a showing that certain stages
of reclamation are complete. Full release of the bond can only be achieved when
all reclamation requirements have been met. Id. § 1269(c).
14 30 U.S.C.A. § 1269(f) (West Supp. 1978).
,' Id. § 1259(f), 1259(g).

,' H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 625-26.
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contest a bond release is smaller than that class of persons with
"an interest which is or may be adversely affected" who are allowed to contest an application for a permit. The fact that the
standing requirement employed in. the "citizen suits" section of
the Senate bill, which read "any person having a valid legal interest," was given precisely the same committee interpretation as the
House bill's "any person having an interest" suggests that the
difference in phraseology is insignificant.' One might also wonder
why the Act provides for personal notice to neighbors of a proposed
bond release," 9 but fails to so notify the same persons of the filing
of an applicationto open a surface mine. 5 Despite these questions,
the insertion of public participation into the bond release procedure is an important development in the regulation of surface mining and is one which is likely to result in vigorous review of many
operators' reclamation efforts.
E. Rulemaking
In addition to providing avenues for citizen participation in
the procedures actually used in regulating surface mining, the Act
also provides for citizen input into its rulemaking procedures. Section 201 authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to "publish and
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes and provisions of this act.""' Section 201 further
provides that "[a]fter the Secretary has adopted the regulations
required by section 501 of this title, any person may petition the
director to initiate a proceeding for the issuance, amendment or
'5 2
repeal of a rule.'

The rulemaking is controlled by section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act,' which provides for notice and an opportunity
", Supra note 120. The final regulations treat the terms as identical. See note
122, supra.
14 30 U.S.C.A. § 1269(a) (West Supp. 1978).
140See text accompanying notes 49-52, supra.
15 30 U.S.C.A. § 1211(c)(2) (West Supp. 1978).
122Id. § 1211(g). This subsection specified a procedure for filing such petitions
and allows the Director of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement to "hold a public hearing or. . . conduct such investigation or proceeding as
the Director deems appropriate in order to determine whether or not such petition
should be granted." Id. § 1211(g)(2), 1211(g)(3). The decision on the petition must
be made within ninety days, and if the petition is denied, the applicant must be
given written reasons for the denial. Id. § 1211(g)(4).

1= 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (1977).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss4/7

30

Barrett: Citizen Participation in the Regulation of Surface Mining

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
for interested persons to participate "through submission of written data, views, or argument with or without opportunity for oral
presentation."'' 4 In addition to these federal rulemaking requirements, the approval by the Secretary of the Interior of any state
program pursuant to section 503 must be preceeded by a public
hearing within that state.' Prior to the promulgation and implementation of any federal program, notice and a public hearing
within the affected state must also be provided.'56
While the rulemaking procedures under the Act are not particularly unusual, the provisions regarding judicial review of such
rulemaking are both unusual and controversial. Rulemaking by
the Secretary, including approval or disapproval of state programs
as well as promulgation of federal rules and regulations, is reviewable subject to specific restrictions. 7 As is common practice, the
scope of review of agency rulemaking is limited. A federal court is
compelled to affirm unless it concludes that the Secretary's action
is "arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise inconsistent with law."5 A
more serious limitation on judicial review, however, is that standing to bring an action to review a rulemaking decision by the Secretary is severely restricted. Section 526 of the Act provides that a
petition for review of rulemaking decisions "may be made by any
person who participated in the administrative proceedings and
who is aggrieved by the action of the Secretary.""'5 This requirement of prior participation is puzzling. It presents the possibility
that one who failed to comment because he failed to understand
the full import of the proposed rule or because his concerns were
adequately expressed by others will forfeit the right to review the
final rule.
The standing requirement also raises the possibility that Congress, in an effort to encourage participation at the administrative
level, may have burdened the regulatory authority with unnecessary duplication of input from those who are concerned with pre154
Id.

§ 553(c).
1'530 U.S.C.A. § 1253(b)(3) (West Supp. 1978).
14 Id. § 1254(c).
"7 Id. § 1276(a)(1).
' See Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (1977).
' 30 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978). Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof," 5 U.S.C.A. § 702
(1977).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 81

serving their standing for review. If Congress had merely intended
to avoid judicial review of agency action on the basis of objections
that were never made at the administrative level, it could have

done so in much clearer terms."'0 Nevertheless, the limitation of
judicial review of rulemaking to those who participated at the

agency level may not be subject to challenge. Historically, due
process considerations have been deemed not relevant to

"legislative" decisions."' In addition, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in Gage v. United States Atomic Energy
Commission'62 not only approved, but in fact implemented, a requirement of participation in rulemaking at the agency level as a
condition precedent to judicial review under the Administrative
Orders Review Act.' It is important to note, however, that the
court's reasoning in Gage suggests no compelling argument for the
limitation of parties. Its main concern appears to have been that
all issues be raised at the administrative level."6 4 Although the
3
limitation of issues on'judicial review represents sound policy,"'
the further limitation of partieswho are entitled to judicial review

of a rule does little to further the purposes of the Act."' In fact, it
11 For example, the Clean Air Amendments of 1977 contain a provision which
limits judicial review to "[o]nly an objection to a rule which was raised with
reasonable specificity during the period for public comment (including any public
hearing)." 305 Pub. L: No. 95-95, § 305, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607)
(Pamph. 3 Nov. 1977).
" Supra note 31.
112 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Easton Utilities Comm'n v. AEC,
424 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'9 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1976).
I" [Albstinence from the administrative process will probably preclude
the compilation of a record adequate for judicial review of the specific
claims [the applicant] has reserved. That is what happened in this
case-and the effect of this void in the record on our ability to analyze
petitioner's major claim highlights the flaw in their petition for relief from
this court.
479 F.2d at 1219.
"I See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
IUA commentator on the Gage decision has remarked:
This conclusion obviously has startling implications for the conduct of
informal rulemaking proceedings. It must be administered with care and
caution. The idea that informal rulemaking proceedings operate upon
"parties" is itself foreign to the nature of such proceedings. Moreover,
even the excusable failure to appear would have no bearing on whether
or not the rule should have a binding effect. Many people may not want
to undertake the burden of an appearance if they feel that the rule when
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might defeat such purposes by presenting a procedural trap for the
unwary.
CONCLUSION

The opportunity for citizen participation in the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 may be seen as a major
accomplishment in environmental legislation. Whether Congress
has gone so far as to recognize that citizens affected by nearby strip
mining are parties with constitutionally protectable interests in
effective mining regulation remains a debatable point. More likely,
the citizen's role has been framed in a more political light and, to
an extent, a more practical one. Congress may well expect that the
citizens who have expressed such vocal concern about the hazards
of strip mining will see that the Act is properly enforced. It may
even rely on these expectations.
The success or failure of a national coal surface mining
regulation program will depend, to a significant extent, on the
role played by citizens in the regulatory process. The State or
Department of Interior can employ only so many inspectors,
only a limited number of inspections can be made on a regular
basis and only a limited amount of information can be required
in a permit or bond release application or elicited at a hearing.
Moreover, a number of decisions to be made by the regulatory
authority in the designation and other processes under the act
are contingent on the outcome of land use issues which require
an analysis of various local and regional considerations. While
citizen participation is not, and cannot be, a substitute for governmental authority, citizen involvement in all phases of the
regulatory scheme will help insure that the decisions and actions of the regulatory authority are grounded upon complete
and full information. In addition, providing citizens access to
administrative appellate procedures and the courts is a practical and legitimate method of assuring the regulatory authority's
compliance with the requirement of the act. 6 '
enacted will not operate against them. If they guess incorrectly, the
courts should be reluctant to preclude their right to judicial review unless
it appears that, as with the petitioners in Gage, they could easily have
presented their case to the agency but chose to stay away.
Verkuil, JudicialReview of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 236-37 (1974).
See also Note, Jurisdictionto Review FederalAdministrativeAction: DistrictCourt
or Court of Appeals, 88 HARv. L. REv. 980, 996 (1975).
I" H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 625.
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Some environmentalists might view the reliance on citizen vigilance as a method of avoiding serious regulation by engaging in
tough enforcement only where the public has expressed concern.
Whether this view is warranted is debatable. It is important nevertheless that individuals make a conscientious attempt to use the
methods available to them to see that the Act is properly enforced.
Responsible public participation can result in the two-fold
achievement of providing adequate protections to affected persons,
while at the same time aiding the regulatory authority in the efficient enforcement of the Act.
Finally, it must be noted that although there is hardly an area
of the Act which does not provide some opportunity for citizen
participation, nearly every relevant section contains some ambiguity or limitation which can be construed so as to deprive citizen
participation of its effectiveness. In some cases these limitations
may even result in a denial of due process, but in all cases these
limitations seem to reflect a confusion of policy-a belief on the
one hand that citizen participation is vital to the effective control
of surface mining, and a fear on the other that a valuable energy
resource will be tied up by the continuing opposition of concerned
citizens.
Joshua I. Barrett
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